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I.
IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE
AND CERTIFICATES PURSUANT TO FED. R. APP. P. 29
Amicus curiae, the American Center for Law & Justice (“ACLJ”), is an
organization dedicated to defending constitutional liberties secured by law. ACLJ
attorneys have argued before the Supreme Court of the United States and other
federal and state courts in numerous cases involving constitutional issues. E.g.,
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr.
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993). ACLJ attorneys also have
participated as amicus curiae in numerous cases involving constitutional issues
before the Supreme Court and lower federal courts.
The ACLJ has been active in litigation concerning the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (“PPACA”). The
ACLJ filed amici curiae briefs in the following challenges to the PPACA: Virginia
v. Sebelius, No. 3:10-CV-188-HEH (E.D. Va.); Florida v. United States Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-CV-91-RV/EMT (N.D. Fla.); TMLC v. Obama,
No. 10-2388 (6th Cir.); and Virginia v. Sebelius, Nos. 11-1057, 11-1058 (4th Cir.).
Additionally, the ACLJ represents the plaintiffs in Mead v. Holder, No.
1:10-CV-00950-GK (D.D.C.), appeal filed, Seven-Sky v. Holder, No. 11-5047
(D.C. Cir.), another case challenging the PPACA. As such, the ACLJ has an

1
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interest that may be affected by the instant appeal because any decision by this
court would be persuasive authority in Seven-Sky.
Moreover, this brief is filed on behalf of amici curiae United States
Representatives Paul Broun, Robert Aderholt, Todd Akin, Steve Austria, Michele
Bachmann, Spencer Bachus, Roscoe Bartlett, Marsha Blackburn, Larry Bucshon,
Dan Burton, John Campbell, Francisco “Quico” Canseco, Eric Cantor, Mike
Conaway, Scott DesJarlais, Blake Farenthold, Stephen Fincher, Chuck
Fleischmann, John Fleming, Bill Flores, Virginia Foxx, Trent Franks, Scott
Garrett, Bob Gibbs, Phil Gingrey, Louie Gohmert, Tom Graves, Tim Griffin,
Gregg Harper, Vicky Hartzler, Wally Herger, Tim Huelskamp, Randy Hultgren,
Lynn Jenkins, Bill Johnson, Walter Jones, Jim Jordan, Mike Kelly, Steve King,
John Kline, Doug Lamborn, Jeff Landry, James Lankford, Robert Latta, Cynthia
Lummis, Donald Manzullo, Kenny Marchant, Kevin McCarthy, Tom McClintock,
Thaddeus McCotter, Cathy McMorris Rodgers, Gary Miller, Jeff Miller, Randy
Neugebauer, Richard Nugent, Alan Nunnelee, Pete Olson, Ron Paul, Steve Pearce,
Mike Pence, Joe Pitts, Mike Pompeo, Bill Posey, Ben Quayle, Scott Rigell, Phil
Roe, Steve Scalise, Bobby Schilling, Lamar Smith, Marlin Stutzman, Tim
Walberg, Joe Walsh, Daniel Webster, and Don Young, who are seventy-four
members of the United States House of Representatives in the One Hundred
Twelfth Congress.

This brief is also filed on behalf of the Constitutional

2
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Committee to Challenge the President and Congress on Health Care, which
consists of over 70,000 Americans from across the country who oppose the
individual mandate.
Amici curiae are dedicated to the founding principles of limited government
and to the corollary precept that Article I of the Constitution contains boundaries
that Congress may not trespass—no matter how serious the nation’s healthcare
problems. Amici curiae believe that the Constitution does not empower Congress
to require Americans to purchase government-approved health insurance or pay a
penalty.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a), amici curiae certify
that the parties have consented to the filing of this brief. Also, pursuant to Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(c)(5), amici curiae certify that no counsel for any
party authored this brief in whole or in part, nor did any person or entity, other than
amici and its counsel, make a monetary contribution to the preparation and
submission of this brief.

3
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II.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.

Whether the district court properly concluded that Section 1501 of the
PPACA exceeds Congress’s authority under Article I of the Constitution.
Answer: Yes.

II.

Whether the district court properly concluded that Section 1501 is not
severable from the remainder of the PPACA, and, therefore, the entire
PPACA is unconstitutional. Answer: Yes.
III.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Amici curiae address only two parts of the district court’s final decision and

judgment and urge affirmance of those two parts:

first, the district court’s

conclusion that Section 1501 (also referred to as “the individual mandate”) is
unconstitutional, and second, the district court’s conclusion that Section 1501 is
not severable from the rest of the PPACA, thus making the entire PPACA
unconstitutional.
First, the district court properly concluded that the individual mandate
exceeds Congress’s authority under Article I of the Constitution. The Commerce
Clause authorizes Congress to regulate voluntary economic activity, not economic

4
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decisions, as the federal government maintains.1/ The Commerce Clause does not
authorize Congress to regulate the inactivity of American citizens by compelling
them to buy a good or service (such as health insurance) as a condition of their
lawful residence in this country or pay a penalty. Because the individual mandate
requires citizens to purchase health insurance or be penalized, the PPACA exceeds
Congress’s Constitutional authority.
Second, the district court properly concluded that the individual mandate is
not severable from the remainder of the PPACA, which, therefore, is invalid in
full.

Although an earlier version of the health care legislation contained a

severability clause, the PPACA does not, and the PPACA’s remaining provisions
cannot function without the individual mandate. These two factors lead to the
conclusion that Congress would not have passed the PPACA without the individual
mandate. Consequently, because the individual mandate is unconstitutional and
not severable from the remainder of the PPACA, the entire PPACA must be held
invalid, as the district court so ruled.

1

/ The federal government argued in the district court that the individual
mandate is constitutional because, among other things, it “regulates economic
decisions regarding the way in which health care services are paid for.” Doc. 55-1
at 35 (emphasis added); see also Doc. 82-1 at 2, 25; Doc. 150 at 52-56. Although
on appeal the federal government emphasizes the argument that the individual
mandate regulates conduct or activity, the importance of the distinction between
decisions and activity is still critical to the proper resolution of this case and will be
discussed herein.
5
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IV.
ARGUMENT
A.
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED
THAT SECTION 1501 OF THE PPACA IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
BECAUSE IT EXCEEDS CONGRESS’S ARTICLE I AUTHORITY
The Supreme Court has noted that
The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated
powers. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. As James Madison wrote, “the
powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the
State governments are numerous and indefinite.”
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (quoting The Federalist No. 45,
pp. 292-93 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)).
1.
Section 1501 Exceeds The Boundaries
Of Congress’s Article I Power
Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian tribes.” Although the scope of this power has been broadened from the
original understanding of a power to “prescribe the rule by which commerce is to
be governed,” Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824), the Supreme

6
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Court has consistently held that Congress’s assertion and exercise of this power is
not unlimited.
A review of four key Commerce Clause cases demonstrates that Section
1501 exceeds the outer bounds of Congressional power and underscores that the
district court properly ruled that Section 1501 is unconstitutional. United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
a.
Lopez And Morrison Repudiate The Federal Government’s Argument That
The Commerce Clause Power Encompasses Economic Decisions
That Substantially Affect Interstate Commerce
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000), illustrate that the Commerce Clause cannot be stretched to
authorize Section 1501. These two recent cases set the outer limits of Congress’s
Commerce Clause power.

According to these two cases, Congress can only

control voluntary economic/commercial activity (for example, the production,
distribution, and consumption of commodities) and cannot control non-economic
activity under the Commerce Clause.

Because Congress cannot control non-

economic activity, Congress obviously cannot control the non-activity of

7
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Americans and certainly cannot control their economic decisions not to purchase a
product, here, health insurance.
In Lopez, the Court held that the Gun Free School Zones Act, which
prohibited the possession of a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school, exceeded
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority because it had “nothing to do with
‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define
those terms.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. The Court discussed Gibbons v. Ogden—
the Court’s first comprehensive review of the Commerce Clause—which stated,
“‘[c]ommerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse.
It describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all
its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that
intercourse.’” Id. at 553 (quoting Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 189-90). The Gibbons
Court observed that the power to “regulate” commerce is the power to “‘prescribe
the rule by which commerce is to be governed’” and noted that “‘[t]he enumeration
[of the power] presupposes something not enumerated.’” Id. (quoting Gibbons, 22
U.S. at 194-95, 196); see also id. at 585-88 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that
the original understanding of the Commerce Clause was much more limited than
the Court’s modern interpretation).
The Lopez Court reiterated the observation made in NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), that the Commerce Clause “‘must be

8
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considered in the light of our dual system of government and may not be extended
so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to
embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the
distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely
centralized government.’” Id. at 557 (quoting NLRB, 301 U.S. at 37). The Lopez
Court identified three “categories of activity” that the Commerce Clause authorizes
Congress to regulate:
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate
commerce. Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from
intrastate activities. Finally, Congress’ commerce authority includes
the power to regulate those activities . . . that substantially affect
interstate commerce.
Id. at 558-59 (citations omitted).
The Court summarized cases dealing with the third category of activity (the
only category at issue here) as holding that, “[w]here economic activity
substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be
sustained.” Id. at 560 (emphasis added). The Act exceeded Congress’s authority
because gun possession was not economic activity, nor was the Act
an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which
the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity
were regulated. It cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases
upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected
with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate,
substantially affects interstate commerce.
9
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Id. at 561. The Court found it significant that the Act “‘plows thoroughly new
ground and represents a sharp break with the long-standing pattern of federal
firearms legislation.’” Id. at 563 (citation omitted).
The federal government argued in Lopez that the Court should focus on
whether, through a chain of inferences, possession of guns in a school zone may, in
the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce, rather than focusing on
whether the statute targeted economic activity.

For example, the federal

government cited the cost-shifting impact on the insurance system, arguing that
gun possession may lead to violent crime, and “the costs of violent crime are
substantial, and, through the mechanism of insurance, those costs are spread
throughout the population.” Id. at 563-64. In rejecting these arguments, the Court
responded by stating:
We pause to consider the implications of the Government’s arguments.
The Government admits, under its “costs of crime” reasoning, that
Congress could regulate not only all violent crime, but all activities that
might lead to violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they relate to
interstate commerce. . . . Similarly, under the Government’s “national
productivity” reasoning, Congress could regulate any activity that it
found was related to the economic productivity of individual citizens:
family law (including marriage, divorce, and child custody), for
example. Under the theories that the Government presents in support of
§ 922(q), it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even
in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where States
historically have been sovereign. Thus, if we were to accept the
Government’s arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by
an individual that Congress is without power to regulate.

10
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Id. at 564 (emphasis added).
The Court noted, in rejecting the federal government’s unduly expansive
view of congressional power, that the Constitution “withhold[s] from Congress a
plenary police power that would authorize enactment of every type of legislation,”
id. at 566, and stated,
[t]o uphold the Government’s contentions here, we would have to pile
inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police
power of the sort retained by the States. . . . To [expand the scope of
the Commerce Clause] would require us to conclude that the
Constitution’s enumeration of powers does not presuppose something
not enumerated, . . . and that there never will be a distinction between
what is truly national and what is truly local. This we are unwilling to
do.
Id. at 567-68 (citations omitted); see also id. at 577-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(noting the importance of federalism principles in interpreting the scope of the
Commerce Clause).
Section 1501 does not withstand scrutiny under Lopez. Being lawfully
present within the United States, like possessing a gun within 1,000 feet of a
school, is not voluntary commercial or economic activity that substantially affects
interstate commerce. The cases Lopez relied upon referred to ongoing commercial
or economic activities that Congress may regulate,2/ and provide no support for the

2

/ See, e.g., United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119
(1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941); Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196.
11
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assertion that the power to “‘prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be
governed’” includes the power to force those who do not want to engage in a
commercial or economic activity to do so. See id. at 553 (quoting Gibbons, 22
U.S. at 196). As in Lopez, “[t]o uphold the Government’s contentions here, we
would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to
convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police
power of the sort retained by the States.” Id. at 567.
A review of Section 1501’s findings illustrates that Congress’s assertion of
Commerce Clause power is unprecedented in its reach.

First and foremost,

Congress sought to obscure entirely the distinction between inactivity and
economic activity by claiming authority over the decision-making of Americans,
stating “[t]he requirement regulates activity that is commercial and economic in
nature: economic and financial decisions about how and when health care is paid
for, and when health insurance is purchased.”

PPACA § 1501(a)(2)(A), as

amended by § 10106(a) (emphasis added). In other words, Congress asserted that
being lawfully present in the United States without health insurance is the
economic activity of deciding not to buy health insurance; as such, Congress may
“regulate” that economic activity by compelling individuals to make a different
economic decision, that is, to buy health insurance. Under this reasoning, virtually
any decision not to buy a good or service would be “economic activity” that can be

12
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targeted by a law requiring individuals to buy that good or service.
The federal government incorrectly contends that inaction and voluntary
economic action are no different for Commerce Clause purposes. The federal
government’s conclusion is fundamentally flawed because it equates abstract
economic decision-making with concrete voluntary economic activity.

Most

American adults make numerous choices on a daily basis concerning when and
whether to spend money on an array of goods and services. A person may choose
to buy X and choose not to buy Y. Under the federal government’s reasoning, so
long as Congress has the authority to regulate the interstate market for Y (which is
often the case), it can mandate that all individuals take part in the market for Y as
consumers—whether they want to or not. Congress would merely need to assert
that because decisions about whether to purchase Y are commercial and economic
in nature, that individuals’ decisions to not buy Y substantially affect interstate
commerce.

Such a view, if accepted by this court, would give Congress an

unprecedented license to regulate American citizens at the expense of the
Constitution’s system of limited powers.
In addition, Congress stated in the PPACA that “[t]he economy loses up to
$207,000,000,000 a year because of the poorer health and shorter lifespan of the
uninsured,” and Section 1501 would “significantly reduce this economic cost.”
PPACA § 1501(a)(2)(E), as amended by § 10106(a). Poorer health and shorter life

13
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spans are often the result of decisions made by Americans regarding their health,
for example, deciding to smoke, not exercise, and/or eat a high fat diet. If the
economic impact of Americans’ poorer health and shorter lifespans provided a
sufficient basis for Congress to mandate that individuals buy health insurance, then
Congress could also mandate that individuals take other actions that Congress
deems necessary to improve health and lengthen life expectancies—such as
requiring Americans to buy a gym membership, maintain a specific body weight,
or eat a healthier diet—or pay penalties for failing to do so.
Congress also alleged that Section 1501 would lower the cost of health
insurance premiums because “[t]he cost of providing uncompensated care to the
uninsured was $43,000,000,000 in 2008,” which was passed on to private insurers
and individuals who have private insurance. PPACA § 1501(a)(2)(F), as amended
by § 10106(a). The federal government made a virtually identical cost-shifting
argument in Lopez,3/ but the Supreme Court held that Congress can only reach
“economic activity” that substantially affects interstate commerce; neither gun
possession nor lawful presence in the United States is economic activity.
Moreover, Congress declared in the PPACA that requiring individuals to

3

/ “The economic consequences of criminal behavior are substantial . . . and,
through the mechanism of insurance, spread throughout the population.” Brief of
the United States, at *28, n.9, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (No. 93-1260),
1994 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 410 (footnote omitted).
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buy health insurance will benefit those who participate in the health insurance
market by “increasing the supply of, and demand for, health care services,”
“reduc[ing] administrative costs and lower[ing] health insurance premiums,”
“broaden[ing] the health insurance risk pool to include healthy individuals,” and
“creating effective health insurance markets in which improved health insurance
products that are guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage of pre-existing
conditions can be sold.” PPACA § 1501(a)(2)(C), (I), (J), as amended by §
10106(a). The Commerce Clause has never been understood, however, to allow
Congress to force unwilling buyers into a market to remedy perceived market
shortcomings, and Congress has never previously tried to do so, underscoring
Congress’s previous restraint in respecting the limits of its Constitutional power.
See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 908-18 (1997) (recognizing that the
absence of statutes in our history imposing certain obligations suggests Congress’s
understanding of a lack of such power).
There have been many times throughout American history when changing
market conditions was a desirable goal, yet
never before has [Congress] used its commerce power to mandate that
an individual person engage in an economic transaction with a private
company. Regulating the auto industry or paying “cash for clunkers” is
one thing; making everyone buy a Chevy is quite another. Even during
World War II, the federal government did not mandate that individual
citizens purchase war bonds.
Randy E. Barnett, Is health-care reform constitutional?, WASH. POST., Mar. 21,
15
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2010, at B2. Although the PPACA is the first federal law to cross the line between
encouraging increased market activity and mandating individual purchases, it will
certainly not be the last if it is upheld.
In addition to Lopez, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000),
demonstrates that Section 1501 exceeds Congress’s power. In Morrison, the Court
held that a portion of the Violence Against Women Act, which provided a civil
remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence, exceeded Congress’s Commerce
Clause authority because “[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any
sense of the phrase, economic activity.” Id. at 613 (emphasis added). Congress
found that gender-motivated violence deters interstate travel and commerce,
diminishes national productivity, increases medical costs, and decreases the supply
of and demand for interstate products, id. at 615, but the Court rejected the
argument “that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct
based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce.” Id. at
617. The Court noted that cases in which it had upheld an assertion of Commerce
Clause authority due to the regulated activity’s substantial effects on interstate
commerce involved the regulation of “commerce,” an “economic enterprise,”
“economic activity,” or “some sort of economic endeavor.” Id. at 610-11. The
Court observed that the government’s attenuated method of reasoning was similar
to the reasoning offered in Lopez and raised concerns that “Congress might use the
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Commerce Clause to completely obliterate the Constitution’s distinction between
national and local authority. . . .” Id. at 615.
Morrison illustrates that Section 1501 exceeds Congress’s Commerce
Clause authority for the same reasons cited above with respect to Lopez.
Following the attenuated chain of inferences offered in support of Section 1501
would lead to an unchecked federal police power allowing Congress, for the first
time in our country’s history, to mandate under its Commerce Clause power a host
of purchases by American citizens.
b.
Neither Wickard Nor Raich Supports A
Congressional Power To Regulate Inactivity
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), and Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1
(2005), two cases the federal government chiefly relies on, do not support its
position that Section 1501 is constitutional or that Congress can control the
inactivity or economic decisions of American citizens.
In Wickard, the Supreme Court upheld provisions of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act that authorized a penalty to be imposed on the plaintiff for
growing more wheat than the marketing quota set for his farm. The Act limited
wheat production to limit supply and stabilize market prices. Wickard, 317 U.S. at
115-16. The plaintiff grew more than twice the quota for his farm; he typically
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sold a portion of his wheat in the marketplace, used a portion for feeding his
livestock and home consumption, and kept the rest for future use. Id. at 114-15.
He argued that the Act exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause power because the
activities regulated were local and had only an indirect effect upon interstate
commerce. Id. at 119. The Court upheld the Act, stating “even if appellee’s
activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still,
whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic
effect on interstate commerce. . . .” Id. at 125.
The Court reviewed a summary of the economics of the wheat industry,
which outlined the interrelationship between market prices and wheat supply in
local communities, the United States, and the world, id. at 125-28, and observed
that “[t]he effect of the statute before us is to restrict the amount [of wheat] which
may be produced for market and the extent as well to which one may forestall
resort to the market by producing to meet his own needs.” Id. at 127 (emphasis
added).

In other words, the penalty targeted farmers who, like the plaintiff,

voluntarily grew far more wheat than the amount needed to fill their own demand
in order to sell most of the excess in the market.
As such, Wickard does not stand for the proposition that Congress may
regulate non-economic activity, or inactivity, that may have some relationship to
interstate commerce so long as it is related to a broad scheme regulating interstate
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commerce, as the government would want this court to believe. Rather, the Court
held that Congress may regulate purely local economic activity (voluntarily
growing a marketable commodity that may be sold in the market or consumed by
the grower) when that economic activity, taken in the aggregate, is directly tied to
and substantially effects interstate commerce.
Wickard provides no support for Section 1501. The statute in Wickard
targeted a specific economic activity—the over-production of wheat, the excess of
which was often sold in the market—which substantially affected prices in the
interstate market for that commodity. Congress could not have dealt with the issue
of low wheat prices by declaring that all Americans must buy a specific amount of
wheat or pay a penalty for failing to do so. An individual’s decision to not buy a
specific amount of wheat, when viewed in the aggregate, would certainly have
impacted overall demand for wheat as well as wheat prices, yet the power “[t]o
regulate Commerce . . . among the several States,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, would
not authorize a mandate that individuals who do not want to buy wheat must do so.
Similarly, Wickard provides no support for Section 1501’s mandate that
individuals who do not want to engage in a commercial transaction (purchasing
health insurance) must do so or suffer a penalty, and, thus, does not support the
government’s incorrect conclusion that Congress’s Commerce Clause power
extends to regulating economic decisions rather than economic activities. See
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Commonwealth of Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 781 (E.D. Va. 2010)
(rejecting the government’s expansive interpretation of “activity” as lacking logical
limitation or support from Commerce Clause jurisprudence.)
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), also does not support the
constitutionality of Section 1501.

In Raich, the Court considered “whether

Congress’ power to regulate interstate markets for medicinal substances
encompasses the portions of those markets that are supplied with drugs produced
and consumed locally.” Id. at 9. The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) created a
“closed regulatory system” governing the manufacture, distribution, and
possession of controlled substances in order to “conquer drug abuse and to control
the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances.”

Id. at 12-13.

Under the CSA, the manufacture, distribution, or possession of marijuana was a
criminal offense. Id. at 14.
California residents who wanted to use marijuana for medicinal purposes
under state law brought an as-applied challenge to the CSA, not a facial challenge
as here. Importantly, the Court emphasized that
Respondents in this case do not dispute that passage of the CSA, as part
of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, was
well within Congress’ commerce power. . . . Nor do they contend that
any provision or section of the CSA amounts to an unconstitutional
exercise of congressional authority. Rather, respondents’ challenge is
actually quite limited; they argue that the CSA’s categorical prohibition
of the manufacture and possession of marijuana as applied to the
intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana for medical
20
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purposes pursuant to California law exceeds Congress’ authority under
the Commerce Clause.
Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
The Court held that “[t]he CSA is a valid exercise of federal power, even as
applied to the troubling facts of this case.” Id. at 9. The Court stated, “[o]ur case
law firmly establishes Congress’ power to regulate purely local activities that are
part of an economic ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.” Id. at 17 (citations omitted; emphasis added). Moreover, “[w]hen
Congress decides that the ‘total incidence’ of a practice poses a threat to a national
market, it may regulate the entire class.” Id. (citing Perez v. United States, 402
U.S. 146, 154-55 (1971)). As such, “when ‘a general regulatory statute bears a
substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances
arising under that statute is of no consequence.’” Id. (citation omitted).
The Court stated that Wickard’s key holding was that “Congress can regulate
purely intrastate activity that is not itself ‘commercial,’ in that it is not produced
for sale, if it concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut
the regulation of the interstate market in that commodity.” Id. at 18. The Court
declared that in both Wickard and Raich, “the regulation is squarely within
Congress’ commerce power because production of the commodity meant for home
consumption, be it wheat or marijuana, has a substantial effect on supply and
demand in the national market for that commodity.” Id. at 19. Moreover, “the
21
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activities regulated by the CSA are quintessentially economic. . . . The CSA is a
statute that regulates the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities
for which there is an established, and lucrative, interstate market.” Id. at 25-26
(emphasis added).
Raich provides no support for Section 1501. Unlike Raich, Plaintiffs here
are not bringing an as-applied challenge to a concededly valid regulatory scheme.
Rather, Plaintiffs contend that Section 1501 on its face exceeds Congress’s
authority and should be declared unconstitutional. Thus, Raich’s emphasis on the
reluctance of courts to prohibit individual applications of a valid statutory scheme
due to the de minimis nature of the impact of the plaintiff’s local conduct is not
implicated by this case.
In addition, the statute in Raich (like the statute in Wickard) sought to
discourage an ongoing “quintessentially economic” activity:

“the production,

distribution, and consumption of commodities for which there is an established,
and lucrative, interstate market.” Id. at 25-26. The Court repeatedly emphasized
that the substantial effects test governs the authority of Congress to target
“activities that are part of an economic ‘class of activities.’” Id. at 17 (emphasis
added) (citation omitted). Since the statutory scheme was concededly valid, the
Court presupposed that “the [regulated] class of activities . . . [was] within the
reach of federal power.” Id. at 23. By contrast, Section 1501 does not regulate an
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ongoing voluntarily economic class of activities “within the reach of federal
power.” See id. Lawful presence in the United States, without more, is not an
economic class of activities akin to the production and distribution of a marketable
commodity. Raich does not support the idea that the targeted economic class of
activities does not need to consist of activity but includes abstract decisions to not
purchase a good or service.
In sum, Supreme Court Commerce Clause jurisprudence does not support a
ruling that Section 1501 is constitutional. As the district court here properly
concluded, “[i]t would be a radical departure from existing case law to hold that
Congress can regulate inactivity under the Commerce Clause. If [Congress] has
the power to compel an otherwise passive individual into a commercial transaction
with a third party . . . Congress could do almost anything it wanted.” Doc. 150 at
42.
2.
Congress Seeks Federal Police Powers
If Congress can coerce a commercial transaction simply by asserting, as it
did in the PPACA, that a decision to not enter the transaction “is commercial and
economic in nature, and substantially affects interstate commerce,” PPACA §
1501(a)(1), and by listing a series of “[e]ffects on the national economy and
interstate commerce,” id. § 1501(a)(2), as amended by § 10106(a), the universe of
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commercial transactions that Congress could force Americans to engage in would
be practically limitless. Very little commercial activity that Congress decided to
require individuals to engage in would be considered too trivial or local to elude
the commerce power. When that principle is coupled with the assumption in the
PPACA that Congress can regulate commercial inactivity by coercing citizens to
purchase any given product, there is no constitutional obstacle to the complete
federal government micro-management of Americans’ financial decision-making.
For example, to try to stabilize the American automobile industry, the
United States Treasury authorized loans to bail out General Motors and Chrysler.4/
Because selling more cars would help restore GM and Chrysler to profitability,
Congress could rationally determine that requiring all Americans above a certain
income level to purchase a new GM or Chrysler automobile would help ensure that
the bailout’s purpose—GM’s and Chrysler’s survival—is achieved. Under the
federal government’s reasoning, Congress would be acting within its commerce
power. After all, the decision whether to buy a car would be, by the federal
government’s reasoning, a commercial and economic one, viewed in the aggregate,
that Congress can regulate under the Commerce Clause. This especially would be
true, under the federal government’s reasoning, if Congress passed a law that no
4

Press Release, United States Dep’t of the Treasury, Secretary Paulson
Statement on Stabilizing the Automotive Industry (Dec. 19, 2008),
http://www.treas.gov/press/ releases/hp1332.htm.
/
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one could be refused the purchase of a car (similar to the existing law that no one
may be refused emergency room care).
Likewise, under the federal government’s reasoning, Congress could
rationally determine that a lack of exercise contributes to poor health, which
increases health care expenses and the cost of health insurance, and threatens
Congress’s attempt to lower health care and health insurance costs. If so Congress
could require Americans to purchase health club memberships, lose weight, or
open up a money market account.
These are not far-fetched conclusions, especially when one considers the
response by the federal government’s attorney to a question by the district court
here and the statements of two prominent supporters of the constitutionality of the
PPACA. During oral argument, the district court asked the federal government’s
attorney whether Law Professor and Dean Erwin Chemerinsky was correct in
saying, while defending the individual mandate, that “‘Congress could use its
commerce power to require people to buy cars.’”

The federal government’s

attorney responded that “maybe Dean Chemerinsky is right.’” Doc. 150 at 46-47.
Also, during the February 2, 2011, hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee
on the PPACA’s constitutionality, the possibility of a “broccoli mandate” and
compelled gym memberships were discussed. While defending the individual
mandate’s constitutionality, former Solicitor General and Harvard law professor
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Charles Fried testified that under the view of the commerce power that would
justify the individual mandate, Congress could compel everyone to buy broccoli
and join a health club.5/
In short, all private decisions to not purchase something can be characterized
under the federal government’s reasoning as commercial and economic activity
and will likely, in the aggregate, affect interstate commerce. If this court upholds
the individual mandate to force private citizens to buy health insurance, the effect
would be to strip any remaining limits on Congress’s power to control individual
economic behavior. As Judge Hudson properly explained, in ruling the individual
mandate unconstitutional, the unchecked expansion of Congressional power as
suggested by the individual mandate “would invite unbridled exercise of federal
police powers.” Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 788.
When President Truman likewise sought to expand federal power over a
substantial portion of the economy by seizing American steel mills, the Supreme
Court was keenly aware of the threat to the Constitution and to Americans’ liberty.
As Justice Frankfurter explained in his concurring opinion, to provide effective
“limitations on the power of governors over the governed,” this Nation’s founders

5

/ Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on the Constitutionality of the
Affordable Care Act, February 2, 2011, available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
hearings/hearing.cfm?id=4964; Doc. 167 at 4-5 n.2.
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rested the structure of our central government on the system of checks
and balances. For them the doctrine of separation of powers was not
mere theory; it was a felt necessity. . . . These long-headed statesmen
had no illusion that our people enjoyed biological or psychological or
sociological immunities from the hazards of concentrated power. . . .
The accretion of dangerous power does not come in a day. It does
come, however slowly, from the generative force of unchecked
disregard of the restrictions that fence in even the most disinterested
assertion of authority.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
The principles of federalism and a limited federal government, like the
separation of powers, are part of the system of checks and balances essential to
limiting centralized governmental power and protecting liberty. Upholding the
individual mandate would effectively confer upon Congress “a plenary police
power,” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566, over all individual economic decisions and place
Americans’ economic liberty at risk. See Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 781, 788.
This court should soundly reject that result and affirm the district court’s ruling
that Section 1501 is unconstitutional.6/

6

/ The Necessary and Proper Clause does not save the individual mandate.
That Clause “grants Congress broad authority to pass laws in furtherance of its
constitutionally-enumerated powers. This authority may only be constitutionally
deployed when tethered to a lawful exercise of an enumerated power.” Sebelius,
728 F. Supp. 2d at 782. Because the individual mandate is unconstitutional, the
Necessary and Proper Clause “may not be employed to implement this affirmative
duty to engage in private commerce.” Id.
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B.
BECAUSE SECTION 1501 IS NOT SEVERABLE FROM THE
REMAINDER OF THE PPACA, THE ENTIRE ACT IS INVALID,
AS THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DECIDED
“The inquiry into whether a statute is severable is essentially an inquiry into
legislative intent.” Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S.
172, 191 (1999). “Congress could not have intended a constitutionally flawed
provision to be severed from the remainder of the statute if the balance of the
legislation is incapable of functioning independently.” Alaska Airlines v. Brock,
480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987). A court must ask “whether [after removing the invalid
provision] the [remaining] statute will function in a manner consistent with the
intent of Congress.” Id. at 685 (original emphasis omitted).
Two factors demonstrate that Congress did not intend Section 1501 to be
severable, and support the affirmance of the district court’s conclusion in that
regard: First, Congress removed a severability clause from an earlier version of
health care reform legislation, and no such severability clause appears in the
enacted version of the PPACA. Second, the PPACA’s remaining portions cannot
function “in a manner consistent with the intent of Congress” without Section
1501. See id.
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The Affordable Health Care for America Act (H.R. 3962), which the House
approved on November 7, 2009, contained an individual mandate section as well
as a severability provision.7/ H.R. 3962’s severability provision, however, was not
included in the final version of the PPACA.

Because Congress consciously

decided not to include a severability clause in the PPACA, Congress obviously did
not intend for the statute’s individual provisions to be severable.
Congress could not have intended the individual mandate to be severable if
severing it would allow an inoperable or counterproductive regulatory scheme to
stand. See Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684; accord Free Enter. Fund. v Pub. Co.
Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3161-62 (2010). The PPACA forbids
providers from refusing health insurance coverage to individuals because of
preexisting conditions. PPACA § 1201. Without the individual mandate, a person
could refuse to purchase health insurance until he incurred an actual injury or
illness requiring medical care. Without the individual mandate, the resulting freeriding could soon cause any private or co-operative insurance provider that
depends on premium dollars to become insolvent.

The PPACA contains

exchanges made up of insurance providers, but does not contain any plan
7

/ Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 255
(2009), available at Bill Summary & Status, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d111:H.R.3962: (click on “Text of Legislation,” then the link for
“Affordable Health Care for America Act (Engrossed in House [Passed House]EH)”).
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completely administered and supported by the federal government. Because the
envisioned insurance providers would depend upon premium dollars, the
individual mandate is designed to bolster the providers’ solvency in each insurance
exchange and thus the operation of the entire regulatory scheme.8/
Because the individual mandate is a foundation of the PPACA’s overall
operation, Congress could not have intended the individual mandate to be
severable from the rest of the PPACA. In fact, it is fair to say that without the
individual mandate, there would be no PPACA. These observations, along with
the fact that Congress deleted a severability provision from an earlier version of the
national health care reform legislation, lead only to one conclusion: the individual
mandate is not severable from the PPACA’s remaining provisions. Thus, because
the individual mandate is unconstitutional, this court should rule the entire PPACA
invalid, as did the district court.

8

/ This does not mean that the connection between the individual mandate
and the rest of the PPACA, while relevant to the severability issue, is a basis for
concluding that the individual mandate is within Congress’s power under the
Commerce or Necessary and Proper Clauses, as argued previously in this brief.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
This court should affirm the district court’s final decision and judgment as
they relate to the district court’s ruling (1) that Section 1501 is unconstitutional and
(2) that Section 1501 is not severable from the rest of the PPACA, thereby causing
the PPACA to be invalid in full.
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